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 1 6 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving 
its objectives without risking war. Beijing 
understands there is a threshold for U.S. 
military response and will continue to 
operate below it. An American president 
would be loath to fire the first shots over 
the Chinese occupation of an uninhab-
ited island. Haddick therefore argues the 
United States should develop policies to 
encourage China to follow the existing 
international rules in letter and spirit. 
Unfortunately, he does not detail these 
policies, leaving his strategy wanting. 
Haddick states that strategy is about 
managing risk. While much of what 
Haddick proposes seems commonsensi-
cal, it is unfinished, and this poses risks. 
Focusing only on punitive measures 
against possible Chinese actions runs 
the risk of ignoring the ways China 
has played by the rules while further-
ing a mind-set where every develop-
ment in the PLA’s modernization is 
perceived as a threat to U.S. regional 
interests—regardless of Chinese inten-
tions. This book should be read as part 
of an ongoing and equally unfinished 
debate on how to handle a rising China. 
IAN T. SUNDSTROM
Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute 
on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95
The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics 
is a collection of thirteen essays as-
sembled by Captain Wayne Hughes, 
USN (Ret.)—author of several books, 
most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal 
Combat and Military Modeling for Deci-
sion Making. Captain Hughes is also 
an accomplished naval officer, having 
served as commanding officer of USS 
Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS 
Morton (DD 948). Notable authors ap-
pearing in On Tactics include Admiral 
Woodward, RN, who commanded 
British forces in the Falklands War, and 
Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the 
Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part 
of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel 
Books series, which is a collection of 
books containing some of the Naval 
Institute’s most well-regarded articles 
from Proceedings—and other sources—
on such topics as naval leadership, 
command, strategy, and cooperation. 
On Tactics is well worth the reader’s 
time, and appropriate for both junior 
and senior officers. It benefits greatly 
from Hughes’s insightful commentary 
and tactful editing, which boils the com-
bined length of the selected essays down 
to a manageable 190 pages. Although the 
topic of tactics is broadly applicable to 
all naval communities, surface warfare 
officers will probably have the easiest 
time relating to the selected essays.
Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a 
favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,” 
written by Hughes himself. “Missile 
Chess” describes a game created by 
Hughes in which players sit down to play 
a traditional game of chess but with a ma-
jor twist: the players have a fixed number 
of “missiles” that they must distribute 
among their pieces as they see fit. The 
pieces still move according to the rules of 
regular chess, but each time they capture 
an opposing piece they expend one “mis-
sile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is 
depleted a piece can still move but can no 
longer capture. After he walks us through 
several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear 
that despite its simplicity, missile chess 
nicely elucidates some of the most vex-
ing operational challenges with which a 
modern naval commander must contend.
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My only criticism of On Tactics is 
that some of the selected essays veer 
into areas that could more aptly be 
described as “strategy” or “enterprise 
management�” For example, “Toward 
a New Identity” chronicles Admiral 
Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet 
together long enough to test the tactical 
doctrines flowing out of the recently 
founded Naval War College� Although 
this is a fine essay, it does not provide 
the reader with any particular insight 
into tactics� Rather, it provides insight 
into why new tactics can be difficult to 
develop� Similarly, “Creating ASW Kill-
ing Zones,” although an excellent piece 
on Cold War antisubmarine warfare 
operations and strategy, does not pro-
vide much in the way of tactical insights 
on how to defeat the submarine threat� 
The great advantage of this book, and 
indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is 
that it makes many excellent articles and 
essays readily available to the reading 
public—essays that might otherwise 
have fallen by the wayside� Overall, 
this volume is an excellent addition to 
any personal library� The size of the 
book and length of the articles make 
it an excellent work for professional 
development, wardroom discussion, 
and thought-provoking conversation�
CHARLES H� LEWIS
Wachman, Alan M� Why Taiwan? Geostrategic 
Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stan-
ford, Calif�: Stanford Univ� Press, 2007� 272pp� 
$25�95 
Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan 
Wachman was a giant in the China, East 
Asian studies, and international rela-
tions field who remains sorely missed 
following his untimely death in 2012� 
In what is widely considered one of his 
major scholarly contributions, through 
this pithy, well-researched book—rightly 
considered a classic—Wachman engages 
in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis 
to offer provocative coverage of histori-
cal episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s 
status fundamentally� Some events raise 
penetrating questions about what might 
have resulted had they ended differently; 
other factors inspire critical questions 
about East Asia’s future� Wachman de-
velops a theme of the strategic salience 
of “imagined geography” as the best 
explanation for the significant variation 
over time in the association of Taiwan 
as part of Chinese sovereign territory 
in the minds of the leaders, and even 
the populace, of mainland China� He 
does so through close examination of 
key Chinese documents and terminol-
ogy as well as careful consideration of 
their relative authority and reliability� 
Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen, 
Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Com-
munist Party, Mao Zedong, and even 
possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially 
consider Taiwan to be part of China in 
the sense that it is understood officially 
today� This approach raises compelling 
questions about state formation and 
national identity that are critical to the 
understanding of international relations� 
Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined 
geography” is a global phenomenon and 
hardly peculiar to China� It is important 
to remember that Taiwan was formally 
incorporated into Qing administration 
in 1683, nearly a century before the 
founding of the United States� One may 
contrast such historical events as the 
American acquisition and incorpora-
tion of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude 
that the factors Wachman considers do 
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